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476 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Real Property-Specific Performance-Interest of
Tenant by Curtesy Initiate
Has a tenant by the curtesy initiate sufficient interest in the wife's
land to support an action for specific performance, so far as his in-
terest is concerned, under a contract of sale signed by said tenant
and his wife, where the wife's privy examination is not taken? The
Supreme Court of North Carolina thinks so.'
By constitutional2 and statutory3 provisions North Carolina has
stripped the husband's curtesy right of its ordinary common law at-
tributes. 4 Birth of issue alive capable of inheriting no longer gives
the husband a present estate in the wife's land.5 From the date of
marriage he has the right of joint occupancy8 with the wife, and
upon birth of issue becomes a tenant by the curtesy initiate, confer-
ring the privileges of joint occupancy with the wife, of serving as
a tales juror,7 and the possibility of gaining a freehold estate for
life if the wife predecease him, dying intestate,8 and he has not for-
feited his right.9 He has no vested interest 10 in the wife's realty,
no present estate, and although the principal case terms it a "val-
uable interest'l others have held it to merely constitute a veto
' Colwell v. O'Brien, 198 N. C. 228, 151 S. E. 190 (1930), dismissing a
petition to rehear from 196 N. C. 508, 146 S. E. 142 (1929).
'N. C. Const. Art. X, §6.
'N. C. Cons. Stat Ann. (1919) §2510.
"Thompson v. Wiggins, 109 N. C. 108, 14 S. E. 301 (1891), holding that a
tenant by the curtesy initiate could not maintain an action for rents due on
his wife's real estate, since the wife was the real party in interest.
Thompson v. Wiggins, supra note 4.
'Walker v. Long, 109 N. C. 510, 14 S. E. 299 (1891) (that wife may sue
alone in action involving her real property) ; Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 176 N. C.
182, 96 S. E. 988 (1918) ; Jones v. Coffey, 109 N. C. 515, 14 S. E. 84 (1891).
'Thompson v. Wiggins, supra note 4; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2519;
Hodgin v. R. R., 143 N. C. 92, 55 S. E. 413 (1906) ; Jackson v. Beard, 162 N. C.
105, 78 S. E. 6 (1913). But see Sipe v. Herman, 161 N. C. 107, 76 S. E. 556
<1912).
'Freeman v. Lide, 176 N. C. 434, 75 S. E. 936 (1918) ; Richardson v. Rich-
ardson, 150 N. C. 549, 64 S. E. 510 (1909) ; Tiddy v. Graves, 126 N. C. 620,
36 S. E. 127 (1900).
' N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §§2519, 2522 (divorce a vinculo and felon-
ious slaying), 2524 (husband's living in adultery, etc., or divorce a mensa at
wife's suit), 2516 (release).
"0Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, supra note 6; Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132 N. C.
947, 44 S. E. 655 (1903) (not such a vested interest as to prevent abolishment
by subsequent laws-a mere expectancy or possibility of future acquisition is
not a vested right). Eames v. Armstrong, 146 N. C. 1, 59 S. E. 165 (1907)
(husband's attempted redemption of wife's land sold for taxes ineffective since
le had no interest therein).
' Colwell v. O'Brien, supra note 1.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
-power,12 the right "to come home,"'1 the right of ingress and egress
to the dwelling and society of the wife, with a "possibility of in-
1ieritance."' 4  However, the present court does not feel that deter-
-mination of the precise interest involved is necessary. 15
The principal case presents for the first time in North Carolina' 8
the question of whether the husband's modem-day estate by the
,curtesy initiate is of a sufficiently tangible nature to carry a monetary
value so far as third parties are concerned. The answer of the
North Carolina court not only establishes such monetary value, but
sees in it sufficient tangibility to permit of specific performance.
'Which presents the question of the rights of the wife in the face of
such a decree of specific performance.
Through the conveyance decreed by the court the purchaser suc-
ceeds to whatever rights the husband may ever have as tenant by
the curtesy consummate-and by it the husband renders ineffective
any subsequent joindure in his wife's deed to the property in ques-
tion, so far as his interest therein is concerned. Hence, any subse-
quent purchaser from the wife, although the husband join in the
deed, takes subject to the outstanding rights of the holder of the
husband's deed to his curtesy right, should the wife die intestate
before the husband. This prevents the wife's disposal of her prop-
erty at full market value, since her purchaser faces the possibility
of an intervening estate for the life of the surviving husband. Such
impairment of the wife's estate constitutes a cloud on title,'7 and
although placed there by judicial decree, such decree was aimed at
the husband and should not be allowed to prejudice the rights of
the wife in contravention of her constitutional privileges.' 8
'Dissenting opinion of Clark, C. J., in Jackson v. Beard, 162 N. C. 105, 111,
78 S. E. 6 (1913) ; Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, supra note 6.
Manning v. Manning, 79 N. C. 293 (1878) ; State v. Jones, 132 N. C. 1043,
43 S. E. 939 (1903), refusing to allow trespass by wife against husband for
coming on her lands against her orders, since such would constitute judicial
separation by the criminal action of trespass. Clark, C. J., dissents, and
would have allowed trespass.
1'Dissenting opinion of Clark, C. J., in Jackson v. Beard, supra note 12;
Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, supra note 6.
"To quote from the decision: "But without regard to the precise interest
which a tenant by the curtesy initiate may have.. ..
"No decisions dealing with the same matter have been found in any states
under modern statutes similar to those of North Carolina. An analogy to
common law curtesy right would not be pertinent.
' N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §1743 and annotations, dealing with quiet-
ing of titles.
" N. C. Const., Art. X, §6.
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Nor is there simply a substitution of personalities whereby the
wife now has to secure the signature of the husband's purchaser
whereas she formerly had to secure her husband's consent. In order
for her conveyance to be a deed at all she must have the written as-
sent of her husband.19 The effect of his joindure is two-fold, to
validate her deed20 and to convey his interest.2 1 But all of the con-
sideration moves to the wife.22 Under the circumstances of the prin-
cipal case, she must not only obtain the written assent of the husband
in order to make her deed effective, she must secure the release of
her husband's purchaser as well. Thus she is subjected to difficulties
forbidden by constitution and statute.
Conceding that the conveyance of the husband would not prevent
his joining in his wife's deed insofar as giving his written assent is%
concerned, such conveyance by the husband would render ineffective
any. subsequent attempt to transfer his so-called valuable interest in
the wife's land. Now the wife is entitled tb convey her real estate
as she wishes, save that the written assent of the husband must be
obtained, and her privy examination taken. 23 However, by the con-
veyance in question the husband has rendered it impossible for the
wife to pass a fee simple to her realty, since the right to the hus-
band's "valuable interest" rests in a third person, the purchaser of
the husband. Granting that the husband has conveyed no portion of
the wife's title, as such, he has rendered it impossible for her to,
convey a full title. Hence, in effect, it is the same as conveying an
interest of the wife in her land.
By logical application the principal case establishes the right of
the husband to convey his curtesy interest as he wills, under form of
an ordinary sale. If the estate of the wife be thus subject to im-
pairment by private sale or court decree of specific performance,
what is the effect of North Carolina Consolidated Statutes §2510,
providing that no real estate of the wife shall be subject to sale or
lease by the husband, save with proper consent of the wife, and that
no interest of the husband whatever in such property shall be sub-
ject to sale to satisfy any execution obtained against him, and that
every such sale is null and void? What of North Carolina Const.
N. C. Const., Art. X, §6.
N. C. Const., Art. X, §6.
:Jackson v. Beard, supra note 12.
:Manning v. Manning, supra note 13; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919>
§2510; N. C. Const., Art. X, §6.
"N. C. Const., Art. X, §6; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2510.
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Art. X, §6, providing that the wife's real and personal property "shall
'be and remain the sole and separate estate and property of such
female, and shall not be liable for any debts, obligations, or engage-
ments of her husband, and may be devised and bequeathed and, with
the written assent of her husband, conveyed by her as if she were
-unmarried ?"
WALTER HoYLE.
Taxation-Situs of Contract for Purchase of
:Federal Property
In Port Angeles Western Ry. Co. v. Ctliam Cowntyl the de-
fendant assessed for taxation the interest of the plaintiff, a Delaware
corporation, in a contract for the purchase of an unfinished railroad
and certain lands lying in the State of Washington, from the United
States. Title was to be retained by the vendor until the full purchase
price had been paid and certain improvements made. In a previous
case between the same parties it was held that the property itself,
the subject matter of the contract, could not be taxed.2 The present
action was brought under a section of a Washington statute provid-
ing that the interest of purchasers under such contracts shall be per-
sonal property.3 The court held the assessment valid and refused to
enjoin its collection.
While the title to property remains in the United States either
for the purpose of securing the purchase price or the performance
of precedent conditions, it may not be taxed by the states.4 When,
however, all that is required of the purchaser under the terms of the
contract has been done by him, a tax may be levied by the state even
though there has been no formal transfer of legal title.5 It is at
36 F. (2d) 956 (W. D. Wash. 1930).
*Port Angeles Western Ry. v. Clallam County, 20 F. (2d) 202 (W. D.
Wash. 1927).
'Laws of Wash. Ex. Sess., c. 130, s. 33.
'Union Pac. Ry. v. McShane, 22 Wall. 444, 22 L. ed. 747 (1874) ; Kansas
Pac. Ry. v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 603, 21 L. ed. 373 (1872); Irwin v. Wright,
258 U. S. 219, 42 Sup. Ct. 293, 66 L. ed. 573 (1921), although as between private
parties the vendee may be taxed under such executory contract; Bowls v. City
of Oklahoma City, 24 Okla. 579, 104 Pac. 902, 24 L. R. A. (N.- S.) 1299 (1909),
as may a non-resident mortgagee's interest be taxed; Savings & Loan Soc. v.
Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct. 392, 42 L. ed. 803 (1898).
'State v. Itasca Lumber Co., 100 Minn. 355, 111 N. W. 276 (1907). "When
the government has no longer any right or interest in the property which would
justify it in witholding the patent, and the purchaser is in possession, the latter
will be treated as the beneficial owner."
